High-energy liquid jet technology - risk assessment in practice by Hlaváčová, Irena & Mulicka, Iwona
365
O R I G I N A L  P A P E R S
International Journal of Occupational Medicine and Environmental Health 2012;25(4):365 – 374
DOI 10.2478/S13382-012-0053-3
HIGH-ENERGY LIQUID JET TECHNOLOGY – 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE
IRENA M. HLAVÁČOVÁ1 and IWONA MULICKA2
1 VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech Republic
Institute of Physics, Faculty of Mining and Geology
2 Opole University of Technology, Opole, Poland
Faculty of Production Engineering and Logistics
Abstract
Objectives: The contribution deals with a risk assessment in practical applications of the high-energy liquid jet technology 
from the point of view of the risk identification, estimation and evaluation. Materials and Methods: Differences between 
three different types of workplaces are highlighted and analysed – the indoor, the outdoor and the research ones. Theoreti-
cal analyses are supported by particular application of the method for the risk assessment in the Laboratory of Liquid Jets at 
the VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava. This laboratory is primarily oriented to research. Nevertheless, the conclusions 
can be used also for predominantly commercial workplaces. Results: Some new considerations and evaluations concerning 
health and safety are presented. Conclusions: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) procedures were applied and 
their limitations in risk assessment of water jet-based technologies are explained.
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INTRODUCTION
High-Energy Liquid Jet Benefits and Hazards
High-energy liquid jet represents a prospective tool in 
many spheres of human activity like coal mining [1], en-
gineering, car and aircraft industry [2] or demilitarisation 
activities [3]. This technology has become very popular 
also in machining, where it replaces or complements con-
ventional cutting, drilling or milling [4]. 
The main proclaimed benefits of the technology are:
 – cold machining without thermal stress,
 – cutting in any material and 2D or even 3D shape,
 – high cutting accuracy,
 – low environment burden,
 – high thickness limit (up to 300 mm),
 – low requirements on fixing,
 – narrow kerfs saving material.
Softer materials like rubber and foam are cut by pure wa-
ter jet, abrasive water jets cut harder materials like steel, 
titanium, hard rock, common or bullet-proof glass, ce-
ramics and even such materials as corundum or carbides. 
The continuous improvement of the technology includes 
deeper study of relationships between material properties 
and cutting quality [5,6] aimed at better understanding of 
the cutting process as well as prediction and analyses of 
its results. The basis for theoretical description of the in-
teraction between the jet and material was derived in the 
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or water, solid particles and air), are produced either as 
slurry jets or injection jets. Slurry jet velocities resulting 
from the identical pressure are about 20–30% higher and, 
therefore, more dangerous.
The producers have always paid much attention to the high 
reliability of individual components of the system both in 
selection of material and construction design, being aware 
that risks connected with highly pressurized water could 
be enormous. Therefore, most of the severe failures con-
nected with the technology can be ascribed to the human 
factor, either inattention or carelessness.
Sources of the water jet risks and the ways of protection
The brief description of the physical background of the 
technology should make it clear that the most important 
and dangerous is the jet emerging from the nozzle. This 
risk can be eliminated or reduced either by directing the 
stream solely to the regions where no harm is supposed 
(catcher basin), or by the use of various protective mea-
sures (clothes, tools with two triggers which both have to 
work before the lance becomes active, some protective 
shutter etc.) or marking out the dangerous and safe sec-
tors.
Other parts of the high-pressure circuit also represent 
important sources of danger. Fittings can fail and cou-
plings can come apart. Although pressure of the jet 
will drop almost immediately in such cases, even in the 
very short period of time immediately after the failure 
the pressurized water in the hose may cause its flailing 
around and in that way it may cause some damage or it 
can even hurt the operator. Fittings may also leak and 
cause the water to squirt at the same pressure as the jets 
coming from the nozzles at the end of the tool. Precau-
tions to these failures are as follows: using proper fitting 
attached together in a proper manner, regular preven-
tive inspection of all equipment, slow build-up of pres-
sure to enable early detection of problems, and of course 
no repairs with the system under the pressure. All parts 
nineties of the twentieth century and later supported by 
abrasive particle research [7].
In further improvement of the production quality the risk 
assessment based on the FMEA should be helpful simi-
larly to other industrial processes analysed by this meth-
od [8,9]. The concurrent application of this method for 
simultaneous evaluation of the process effectiveness and 
health and safety risks to the operators, however, can yield 
some misrepresenting results. This assumption will be dis-
cussed in the paper.
The technology has become fairly frequent because it is 
advertised to be “friendly and easy to use”. Therefore, 
it should be well estimated especially from the point of 
view of reliability and safety. Although in the international 
scale a great attention is paid to these problems, compe-
tent papers dealing with this problem are still very rare in 
Eastern Europe.
Generally, it can be said that three basic types of work-
places can be distinguished. The commercial indoor and 
outdoor ones are the basic types. The third one is a re-
search workplace that has several specific features. The 
basic common characteristic of all indoor workplaces is the 
highly pressurized water (100–700 MPa) passing through 
a small orifice (0.1–0.5 mm) concentrating the high energy 
into a tiny area to cut or blast material. The velocity of 
the issuing water thus may reach values up to 1100 m×s–1. 
Enormous energy concentrated on the area smaller than 
one tenth of square millimetre brings along the fact that 
the technology may be really dangerous for a human be-
ing if improperly used. Although only medium-pressure 
(~30 MPa) water may be used either in the pulsing jet 
form [10] or with abrasives [11], in many outdoor applica-
tions the concentration of energy still exceeds reasonable 
limits for a human body [12]. Therefore, the working con-
ditions for outdoor workers, frequently operating hand-
held devices, may be really dangerous.
The abrasive water jets (AWJ), in fact consisting of two or 
three components (the mixture of water and solid particles 
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ear protectors should be worn all the time the water jet is 
operating, especially when operating in a confined space. 
The application of silencers may be one of the precautions. 
Placing of the pump into a separate sound-conditioned 
room or using remote controlled water jet machines also 
reduces the operator’s noise exposure.
Water or abrasive spattering may cause serious injury if 
the eyes are hit. The danger extends to the face skin if 
a brittle material, like glass, is being cut. Wearing of the 
protective glasses and the face shield is strongly recom-
mended.
The above survey deals primarily with the industrial ap-
plications. Non-industrial applications mostly differ more 
or less; their characteristics rather resemble those of the 
outdoor ones. The severity of the risk may change to great 
extent in individual workplaces. Examples of the possible 
failures are: internal injury (medicine), bruising from the 
fallen work-piece (rock mining), falls (blasting of high 
buildings), hitting of person standing at the side (internal 
blasting of vessels), displacement of the nozzle and subse-
quent injury to the legs and feet (submerged non-automat-
ed applications), demolition (fire-fighting). Also the noise 
is a serious problem, because its levels exceed the values 
specified for the in-door applications if the jet blows over 
a long distance in the open air [13].
Research workplaces usually abide by common safety 
regulations because skilled and competent workers em-
ployed there are less likely to act recklessly. In this paper, 
some key problems concerning the technology are anal-
ysed from the point of view of the Laboratory of Liquid 
Jet (LLJ) at the VŠB – Technical University (VŠB-TU) of 
Ostrava. The risk assessment based on the FMEA (Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis) method was performed and it 
is reviewed here and modified. Subsequently, some gen-
eral experience is discussed and knowledge from the out-
door applications is compared with the evaluation of risks 
inherent for the in-door workplace.
of the system with pressurized water should be enclosed 
in some protective covering.
Other risks connected with the technology result either 
from the type of application or they are somehow com-
mon to all machinery equipment. Among these the elec-
tric shock hazards should be mentioned (electrically fed 
equipment) as the first one, explosion hazards or oil leak-
age from the hydraulic system can be also quite dangerous. 
These failures are extremely rare in modern well-serviced 
machinery but their likelihood may dramatically rise if the 
proper planning, adequate training and equipment inspec-
tion are neglected.
Characteristics and classification of the workplaces
The most common and probably the safest applications 
of water jets include the in-door industrial applications 
with stationary high pressure water jet machines for cut-
ting or turning, using both pure and abrasive water jets. 
Their operation is CNC controlled and the workplaces are 
very often semi- or fully automated. Protective optical or 
mechanical gates may be installed to prevent injuries due 
to an inadvertent contact of operator with the jet. How-
ever, very often it is necessary to manipulate with mate-
rial quickly and preventing operator’s access to the work-
place may unreasonably slow down the process. Effective 
training programmes and safety measures intended to 
exclude persons intoxicated, taking medications, sick, 
tired or other wise unwell from being allowed to operate 
the water jet cutting machines should perhaps bring the 
same or even better effect.
Sharp edges, either on a cut material or e.g. on the worn 
out catcher, may also represent a significant source of inju-
ries, therefore protective gloves are recommended.
Water jet cutting is usually accompanied by a considerable 
noise burden potentially causing tinnitus, hearing impair-
ment, or eventually deafness if prolonged exposures occur. 
It is supposed that most of the water jetting applications 
produce noise levels above 85 dB A-weighted. Therefore, 
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control, improper adjustment of the water nozzle and the 
focussing tube, sudden water pressure drop due to pump 
failure (Photo 3), water nozzle damage, CNC control 
unit failure, one broken high-pressure capillary tube (far 
enough from the operator) combined with perforation of 
the protective metal shrouding (Photo 4).
Up to now no evaluation of air or water pollution has been 
attempted. Acoustic measurements were carried out in 
the laboratory several times and evaluated from different 
points as part of bachelor or master theses. Noise arising 
both from the pump operation and the cutting itself re-
sults in the decibel level amounting to hygienic limits for 
the low frequencies (below 8 kHz) and even exceeding 
The Laboratory of Liquid Jet at the VŠB – 
Technical University of Ostrava
The high-energy liquid jet technology has been studied at 
the VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava since 1997. The 
Laboratory of Liquid Jet (LLJ) at the Institute of Phys-
ics was established and equipped with the pump capable 
of producing pressure adjustable from 55 to 395 MPa at 
the flow rate up to 1.9 litres per minute. The CNC con-
trolled x-y table 2×1 m2 (with a manually driven z-axis 
and manually set tilting ±90° in the x-z plane) has been 
installed in 2005. Material processing is semi-automated. 
The CNC controlled cutting process is combined with 
manual material handling system (Photo 1).
During 7 years of operation, many kinds of materials 
were cut, various techniques were used and the whole 
process was thoroughly studied. No injuries have oc-
curred during the whole life of the laboratory and no se-
rious health problems have been reported. The ear and 
eye protection has been uncompromisingly used during 
the cutting process.
Some failures have occurred: the work-piece falling into 
the catcher (the most often), water and abrasive scatter-
ing (from the water basin slats) damaging certain materi-
als like glass (Photo 2), congestion of the abrasive feeding 
hose or tube, insufficient air pressure for abrasive feeding 
Photo 1. Laboratory of the Liquid Jets at the VŠB – Technical University of Ostrava
Photo 2. Experimental cutting of glass in the LLJ – scattering 
of the jet on the slat
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that the analysis should be evaluated numerically it is use-
ful to include the criticality analysis and replace FMEA 
by FMECA. Two different approaches should be used: 
mapping the criticality matrix or the risk priority number 
evaluation. The second approach seems to be more useful 
in the case of water jet technology. Analysing the technol-
ogy, it is necessary to divide the system into the key subsys-
tems and to identify the failure modes of these subsystems. 
For each system individual risk assessment is carried out 
based on identification of severity, occurrence and detect-
ability.
The subsystems of the workplace with water jet should be 
like presented in Figure 1:
 – water supplying system,
 – abrasive feeding system,
 – material supply and manipulation,
them (by as much as 10 dB) for the high frequencies (ac-
cording to the Czech Standard). The limit for ultrasonic 
frequencies may be exceeded as well (by up to 19 dB) if 
the improper location of the work-piece is used, i.e. the jet 
passes a long distance in the air [14].
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Use of risk assessment method
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a quali-
tative analysis of hazard identification universally appli-
cable in a wide variety of industries [15]. Its weak point is 
that it does not take into consideration the consequences 
of the human factor (human errors and failures). It is pos-
sible, however, to use the method for identification of the 
components most responsive to the human failures and 
suggest the effective measures eliminating primarily those 
adverse influences.
The basic idea of FMEA is to spot risks and to initiate 
dedicated efforts to control or minimize risks. Supposing 
Photo 3. Damage of the glass due to the sudden pump 
shutdown near the slat
Photo 4. Damaged shrouding of the broken high-pressure capillary
Photo 5. Water jet testing in sandstone quarry Javorka (Czech 
Republic)
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is high (i.e. it exceeds 4 for non-severe failure modes or it 
exceeds 1 in cases when the severity number is 9 or 10).
Detectability
Detectability (D) refers to an ability to identify failures of 
the system correctly by design control regardless of how 
dramatic or subtle they may be. Absolute uncertainty 
should be classified 10, almost certain detection 1.
Risk Priority Number
Having ranked the severity, occurrence and detection 
modes, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated by 
multiplying the three numbers. By comparing the RPN 
numbers, the areas of the greatest concern are identified 
and given the highest priority for corrective action. Al-
though the theoretical instruction seems to be legitimate 
and clear, following it exactly may be misleading or false 
in the case of water jet technology [16]. A single evalua-
tion for two quite different events: quality of the product 
and operation of the system on the one side and health 
and safety of the operating staff on the other side is 
counter-productive. Fatal consequences for the operator 
of some failures may be accompanied by perfect product. 
Insufficient quality of water on the other hand makes no 
harm to the personnel and at the same time may destroy 
the nozzle and stop the operation. Therefore, the risks 
and hazards should be evaluated twice, firstly from the 
point of view of the consequences to work-piece quality 
and secondly with reference to the consequences to hu-
man health (Table 1).
It is obvious that this procedure cannot fully determine 
all really hazardous exposures or events. Although noise 
is one of the most hazardous exposures of the technol-
ogy [13], it has got the RPN only 90, because its detect-
ability is evaluated from the point of view of the equip-
ment – it is certain that the noise should be detected. De-
tection of the impairment of the operator hearing should 
give quite different result and such change in evaluation 
 – control CNC system,
 – final work-piece and waste.
Severity
Severity (S) expresses the consequences of a failure mode. 
Severity considers the worst potential consequence of 
a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property 
damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur. 
In proposed sample evaluation a ten-point scale was used. 
The failures were assessed from the point of view of the 
product quality and proper operation of the equipment.
Occurrence (probability)
It is necessary to look at the cause of a failure and how 
many times it occurs. This can be done following the docu-
ments about failures in similar processes. A failure cause is 
looked upon as a design weakness. All the potential causes 
for a failure mode should be identified and documented. 
This brief paper, however, includes only some very often 
or the most serious examples of causes: water nozzle dam-
age, air pressure drop down, improper operating condi-
tions or person injury. A failure mode is given a probabil-
ity number O, a ten-point scale was used as in the case of 
severity. Actions need to be determined if the occurrence 
Fig. 1. Main subsystems of water jet cutting
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should rise at least to 4–5, giving the final RPN 360. This 
adjustment of the evaluation was included in the following 
risk assessment of practical application of water jetting in 
the sandstone quarry Javorka, Czech Republic (Photo 5) 
representing an outdoor workplace with a hand-handled 
pure water jet. 
RESULTS
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2.
parameter may substantially improve the quality of the 
analysis. This conclusion can be generalized, especially for 
the failure modes concerning health and safety in a fol-
lowing way: The value of detectability of a failure mode, 
particularly that one which has got a wide range of pos-
sible health harm consequences, should be determined re-
gardless of the severity and occurrence number. It means 
the maximum value referring to any possible consequence, 
not only the worst or the most frequent one. After hav-
ing applied this approach, the value of noise detectability 
Table 1. Double evaluation of the Risk Priority Number (RPN) carried out separately for material damage only (MD) and health 
and safety risks (HS) according to the experience in the Laboratory of Liquid Jet
Failure mode
S
O D
RPN
MD HS MD HS
Insufficient quality of water 3 5 3 45
Oil leakage 3 1 3 9
Oil spattering 8 1 10 80
Greasy floor 6 3 1 18
High pressure water fitting leakage 6 2 5 60
High pressurized water spattering 9 1 10 90
Sudden high-pressure drop down 9 2 9 162
Water nozzle damage 9 3 4 108
Abrasive feeding system failure 9 5 2 90
Focusing tube clogging or damage 7 3 4 84
Pressurized air drop-off 5 4 1 20
Direct hit by AWJ 10 1 8 80
Sudden rebounding of abrasive particle or material piece 5 8 4 160
Weak material fixing 9 5 4 4 144 80
Air pollution – inhalation of harmful or toxic materials 5 4 6 120
Water pollution 2 6 7 84
Work-piece fall into the catcher 10 9 1 90
Work-piece damage by the AWJ rebounded from the catcher 
stiffeners and grid holders
9 4 2 72
Sharp edges 3 10 5 150
Electric shock hazard 8 1 6 48
Noise 9 10 1 90
Discomfort from wearing of protectors and noise exposure 10 7 2 140
AWJ – abrasive water jet, S – severity, O – ocurrence, D – detectability.
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workplace – the cutting or blasting may be wrong done or 
the operator may lose stability and fall down as a conse-
quence of sudden unexpected disappearance of the back-
ward force.
The results of the outdoor workplace analysis show that the 
importance of risks and hazards related to human body is 
much higher than those related to the work-piece. The main 
reason is that the required quality of the cutting results is 
much lower and so it is not so dependent on a sudden inter-
ruption unlike the case of the indoor precise abrasive water 
jetting. Therefore, it is necessary to pay much higher atten-
tion to the proper training of the staff working with water 
jets in outdoor applications than in the indoor ones. 
The value of RPN in the second analysis may seem to 
be overestimated, but it must be taken into account that 
DISCUSSION
There are surely various viewing angles that may influ-
ence the results of risk analysis [14]. The presented one 
is aimed at the basic problems of jetting technologies as 
known from several observed practical applications. One 
of the main intentions is to point out the weak deductions 
based on the results of the FMEA or FMECA methods. 
It is obvious that failure modes mostly lead either to the 
failure of the equipment or to the impairment of the crew. 
There are only very few failures which may be dangerous 
to some extent from the both points of view. These are 
“weak material fixing” in the case of an indoor stationary 
workplace – the work-piece may be wrong cut or it may 
cause an injury of staff and “sudden high-pressure drop 
down” in the case of an outdoor man-operated flexible 
Table 2. Evaluation of the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for material damage only (MD) and health and safety risks (HS) based on 
the experience in the quarry Javorka
Failure mode
S
O D
RPN
MD HS MD HS
Insufficient water supply 9 5 3 135
Insufficient fuel supply 9 5 3 135
Oil leakage 3 1 3 9
Oil spattering 6 1 9 54
Greasy ground 6 3 1 18
High pressure water fitting leakage 6 2 5 60
High pressurized water spattering 9 2 10 180
Sudden high-pressure drop down 1 8 2 7 14 112
Water nozzle damage 3 3 4 36
Direct hit by water jet 10 2 8 160
Air pollution 5 4 6 120
Water pollution 2 6 7 84
Sharp edges 3 10 5 150
Electric shock hazard 4 1 6 24
Fire 5 1 1 5
Noise (impairment of the operator hearing) 9 10 4 360
Discomfort from wearing of protectors and noise exposure 10 7 2 140
Abbreviations as in Table 1.
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protec.2009.04.011.
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evaluation was done purposely for the case without appli-
cation of the protective measures in order to emphasize 
the necessity of the ear protection.
CONCLUSIONS
Although there is a general feeling that accidents using 
high-energy water jets are relatively rare, the technology 
has become so widely used that risk assessment cannot be 
underestimated. Brief description of the results of the ap-
plication of the FMECA method to the water jet cutting 
in the Laboratory of Liquid Jets at the VŠB – Technical 
University of Ostrava illustrated that the method should 
be modified, so that difference in ranking of failure modes 
from the point of view of the production quality and staff 
health and safety should not be suppressed. The sim-
plest way to do this is to perform the assessment twice, 
separately from the both points of view. Final risk priority 
number should be weighted sum of the partial ones. There 
is no use in standardization of the value of the weighting 
factors; on the contrary, they represent a tool for indi-
vidual characterization of the workplace, the importance 
of the solved tasks as well as skill and experience of the 
crew. In any case, determination of the weighting factors 
is rather executive than research task. Experienced water 
jet workers, however, are necessary for preparation of reli-
able ranking tables of severity, occurrence and detectabil-
ity for both partial risk priority numbers. These are being 
prepared in the cooperation with several industrial and 
research work places. Including the risk assessment from 
environmental point of view is considered as well.
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